This research explored how approach, acceptance, and avoidance coping styles predicted re-entry stress. Second, it examined how home country sociocultural factors (individualism/collectivism, flexibility/monumentalism, cultural heterogeneity, and Human Development Index) predicted re-entry stress. Third, interaction effects between coping styles and country-level variables on re-entry stress were explored. We analyzed data from an 18-month longitudinal study which followed 1485 high school students before going abroad, while staying abroad, and after returning home. Students came from 45 home countries and studied abroad for 8-10 months. When controlling for baseline levels of stress, multilevel modeling analyses showed that acceptance coping predicted lower re-entry stress while avoidance coping predicted greater re-entry stress. Participants returning home to countries with higher collectivism and cultural homogeneity experienced greater re-entry stress. Collectivism moderated the effect of approach coping on re-entry stress, so that coping by not approaching the stressor was associated with greater stress in collectivist cultures.

Perceiving the ingroup as spiritually formidable-with inner strength and conviction-is strongly associated with the will to self-sacrifice. Yet, its underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Across five studies, we test a mechanism through which spiritual formidability operates: collective narcissism-the belief that the ingroup is exceptional but not sufficiently recognized by others. A preliminary study showed that collective narcissism, but not ingroup satisfaction, predicted costly pro-group sacrifices. Studies 1a and 1b revealed that, among inmates belonging to street gangs or delinquent bands, the perceived spiritual formidability of the ingroup was associated with collective narcissism and willingness to engage in costly pro-group sacrifices. In addition, the effect of perceived spiritual formidability on costly sacrifices was mediated by collective narcissism. Study 2 replicated and extended the effects to self-sacrifice for religion among imprisoned jihadists. Finally, Study 3 offered causal evidence of the mediation among members of the general population.

Expressing gratitude often strengthens relationships, yet many people say "thank you" despite not feeling especially grateful. Although this may seem innocuous, are there hidden costs? We tested the effects of expressed, perceived, and accurate perceptions of gratitude amplification on romantic couples' personal and relational well-being across four dyadic studies ( = 639), including lab conversations (Studies 1a and 2a), naturalistically in daily life (Studies 1b and 2b), and over time (Studies 3 and 4). Findings indicated that higher expressed and perceived gratitude amplification did yield personal and interpersonal costs, which were mediated by lower authenticity and responsiveness. Effects could not be accounted for by alternative explanations, including expressers feeling lower relationship satisfaction or less grateful for their partner. Altogether, we identify a hidden cost of gratitude expressions, indicating that amplified gratitude can undermine couples' well-being by compromising authenticity and responsiveness.

Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) contend that a small, innocuous change will lead to cascading negative consequences. Although SSAs are common in political discourse, they have received little empirical attention in this context. In 15 studies (including samples from four countries and a study of natural language usage on the social media site Reddit), we examine may be most prone to slippery slope thinking and people in general may engage in such thinking. We consider whether individuals of different political ideologies exhibit different degrees of support for SSAs. We test three competing hypotheses that it is (a) political extremists, (b) political liberals, or (c) political conservatives that more strongly endorse SSAs. We consistently find that conservatives endorse SSAs more due to ideological differences in intuitive thinking. We additionally find evidence of these ideological differences in social media behavior, and that slippery slope thinking has consequences for punitive attitudes.

Movements often experience setbacks while striving to achieve (or prevent) social change. We examined whether autonomous motivation-which captures supporters' internalized commitment to a cause-would sustain identification with the movement and collective action after experiencing failure (vs. success) outcomes following the marriage equality vote in Australia (Study 1; = 186), and an experimental induction of movement failure (Study 2; = 137). Autonomous motivation positively predicted identification and collective action, but there was no evidence of moderation by outcome. In Study 3 ( = 377), we experimentally manipulated outcomes (success/failure) and framing (specific/broad) of the climate action movement. We found evidence of a three-way interaction such that the effects of autonomous motivation on identification were strongest after a specific campaign failure. We conclude that autonomous motivation can help to buffer the demotivating effects of a specific failure as well as sustaining identification and commitment to action broadly.

People readily moralize health, whether by criticizing smokers or treating exercise as noble. Drawing from the theory of dyadic morality, we theorized that people moralize health most strongly when they perceive poor health as a source of suffering. Through five studies (total = 2,055), we show that perceived harm can drive the moralization of health. We identified three types of harm-personal, interpersonal, and collective-that people perceive as relevant to health and created a 15-item measure to capture each (Study 1). Perceived interpersonal harm reliably predicted moralizations of health, whether health was conceived broadly (Study 2) or as a concrete health issue (e.g., smoking, eating healthfully, disease prevention; Study 3). Experimentally manipulating the interpersonal harmfulness of a health behavior caused participants to moralize it (Studies 4 and 5), whereas disgust had no unique effect (Study 4). We suggest that perceived harm plays a key role in moralizing health.

Recent perspectives have challenged the view that left-wingers are less likely to derogate out-group members. Building on research demonstrating heightened out-group derogation by Progressive (vs. Traditional Liberal) left-wingers, we examined whether Progressives and Traditional Liberals differentially tolerate in-group dissenters on the issue of gender identity. Using reverse correlation, Study 1 found that the Progressive-generated face of J.K. Rowling (a prominent gender critical left-winger) was evaluated negatively, while the Traditional Liberal-generated face was evaluated positively. Study 2 found that in both abstract (general description) and concrete (public figure) presentations, faces of left-wing in-group members expressing gender critical views were judged more negatively than self-identification faces, with Progressive-generated gender critical faces evaluated more negatively than Traditional Liberals-generated faces. Replicating Study 1, the Rowling face generated by Traditional Liberals was evaluated positively. These findings suggest an ideological asymmetry of derogation within left-wing kinds, offering evidence of opposing representations of a dissenting in-group target.

Microaggressions require an inferential process for their aggressive intent to be recognized. Using approaches from pragmatics, especially relevance theory, we conducted experiments to examine factors predicted to influence perceptions of an utterance as a microaggression. Participants read scenarios describing an interaction between two people and indicated their perceptions of a target remark. We expected and found that an utterance was more likely to be perceived as a microaggression if (a) it occurred in a context for which its relevance was not clear, thereby prompting observers to infer an aggressive intent, and (b) the recipient was a person of marginalized status. Furthermore, these effects were larger for participants with a more liberal political orientation relative to those who were more conservative. This was due, in part, to variability in Theory of Mind capabilities and beliefs about microaggressions associated with political orientation.

How people respond to uncertainty has far-reaching socio-political consequences. When perceived as fixed and threatening, individuals may gravitate toward ideologies that undermine intergroup relations and social cohesion. We examined whether fostering an mindset (viewing uncertainty as malleable and an opportunity) promotes positive diversity attitudes and indirectly affects commitment to societal change and support for right-wing populism. During Germany's 2025 federal election, we ran a 3-month online study with German citizens ( = 745). Participants who received an uncertainty mindset intervention (vs. control) reported a higher uncertainty-as-enabling mindset, which was linked to stronger commitment to societal change through higher perceived productivity of diversity and lower aversion to intergroup contact. The mindset was also linked to a lower likelihood of voting for a right-wing populist party via the same pathways. Shifting how individuals appraise uncertainty may thus be a promising strategy for strengthening democratic resilience by cultivating openness to diversity.

Generalized morality refers to the use of prior knowledge of others' morality to infer unknown aspects of morality, which is a crucial heuristic for obtaining cooperative partners in a large society. This research investigated how information is used for generalized morality. It was predicted that group-level generalized morality, or moral stereotyping, would come first when the information is limited, thereby people rely on a surface cue. As information increases, they come to use individual-level generalized morality, which is shown by Jackson et al. Following Jackson et al., the current research employed an agent-based modeling (Study 1) and human study (Study 2). Study 1 found that participants used moral stereotyping first in their interactions when the visual cue-morality association was salient. Study 2 also showed the same trend. This research worked as a replication of the previous study and as an important extension to understanding how moral cognition develops.

Conflicting information can significantly undermine emotions, cognition, and behavior. This paper aims to understand the negative impact of conflicting information through the lens of conflictive uncertainty. Conflictive uncertainty encompasses two dimensions: the epistemological dimension, which involves uncertainty and ambiguity about outcomes and probabilities, and the interpersonal dimension, which arises from doubts about the credibility of sources. Three experiments were conducted to test this framework. Experiment 1 found that, under conflictive uncertainty, participants rated lower source credibility and exhibited weaker preferences compared to ambiguity. Experiment 2 revealed that the negative impact of conflicting information on the strength of preference was mediated by reduced source credibility and increased perceived uncertainty. Experiment 3 demonstrated that neutralizing the loss of credibility mitigated the adverse effects of conflicting information on the strength of preference. These findings highlight the roles of source credibility and perceived uncertainty in understanding the negative effects of conflicting information on decision-making.

Hostile sexism evokes women's resistance necessitating benevolent sexism to promote cross-gender cooperation. Addressing inconsistent, primarily self-report evidence for ambivalent sexism theory principles, we test the actor and partner effects of sexist attitudes on behaviors exhibited within heterosexual couples' interactions ( = 855 dyadic interactions). Showing that men's hostile sexism likely incites resistance, men's hostile sexism predicted more hostile and less responsive behavior by men and their women partners. Providing new behavioral evidence that benevolent sexism may promote heterosexual cooperation, men's benevolent sexism predicted less hostile and more responsive behavior by men and their partners. Illustrating that benevolent sexism is also likely to have costs for women and men, women's benevolent sexism predicted more hostile behavior by women and their partners, particularly when men partners were low in benevolent or high in hostile sexism. We emphasize the importance of examining how sexist attitudes influence actor and partner behavior across different contexts.

Four studies examine whether demographic forms elicit social identity threat and institutional exclusion for Latine Americans before and after the 2020 Presidential election and leading up to the 2024 election. Using a mock-Census form and widely used ethnicity/racial designations, we manipulated the framing of Latine identity through a two-item (category listed separately) versus a single-item (combined) format, and also varied the inclusion of a citizenship question. Overall, Latine Americans who completed a two-item versus a single-item mock-Census form experienced greater social identity threat, institutional exclusion (e.g., threatened belonging), more negative external perceptions of Latine Americans, and lower Latine and American identification. Reactions to the citizenship question were particularly attenuated by study timepoint and sociopolitical context but also revealed a concern over confirming negative stereotypes about Latine Americans related to immigration and citizenship status. Results suggest Latine Americans face identity threat through demographic forms, and this may affect their sense of belonging within the United States.

Assertively pursuing sexual needs versus complying or accommodating to partner's sexual desires has considerable implications. We apply and integrate general theories of power to identify how people's own power (actor power) and perceptions of their partner's power (perceived partner power) differentially relate to sexual behaviors and motivations in woman-man relationships. Across three studies (total = 995), actors' power predicted sexual approach-inhibition: actors higher in power reported more comfort initiating and refusing sex, more assertive sexual communication, and less sexual compliance. By contrast, perceived partner power predicted sexual accommodation-neglect: when partners were perceived to be higher in power, actors expressed greater willingness to compromise and sexual communal strength, and greater understanding when partners rejected sex. These distinct effects were not magnified by asymmetries in perceived power, nor did they differ across gender. Facilitating actor and partner power in intimate relationships should reduce rather than amplify harmful sexual behavior.

For the billions who practice a religion, gratitude is thought to be often expressed toward their God in prayers. We build upon two theoretical frameworks to test the effects of gratitude to God on factors central to maintaining religion: a relationship with God and incentive salience for repeating prayer. We developed a protocol to collect spoken prayers and diary data over 2 weeks ( = 93 Christians; 1,118 prayers). We present two automated text analysis methods to index gratitude in transcribed prayers: dictionary-based and GPT-4. We find that GTG is often expressed in prayers, and when people express more GTG in their prayers than their average, they report a better relationship with God and more incentive salience (positive spontaneous thoughts) about prayer. Evidence was not strong for repeating the prayer behavior. We discuss implications for the theory of gratitude and religion and methods for capturing genuine data on private behaviors like prayer.

This research identifies awe as an emotional factor that promotes perspective-taking. Utilizing a multi-method approach, we systematically investigate the influence of awe on perspective-taking, exploring its mechanisms and downstream consequences. We consistently found that awe is associated with (Studies 2 and 4) and promotes (Studies 1, 3, and 5) perspective-taking, with self-transcendence mediating this relationship (Studies 3, 4, and 5). Furthermore, the downstream effects of awe and perspective-taking manifest in association with (Study 4) and promote cooperative behavior (Study 5). The impact of awe on perspective-taking was not reducible to its positive valence (Study 1), and the mediation model was established beyond the influence of the small self (Study 3). These findings enrich the research on the relationship between emotions and perspective-taking, emphasizing the role of awe in promoting social cohesion.

Punishment is a critical mechanism through which society regulates behavior, yet its efficacy depends on how observers interpret the legitimacy of punishers. Across five experiments, we examine how moral agreement with punished acts shapes perceptions of punishers' legitimacy and willingness to obey laws. Experiment 1 finds that when observers morally agree with punished acts, they perceive punishers as less legitimate and report lower willingness to obey laws. Experiment 2 shows that this effect extends to compliance with a new, specific law introduced by the punishing authority. Experiment 3 finds that when moral agreement and procedural justice are manipulated simultaneously, only moral agreement predicts willingness to obey laws. Experiment 4 replicates these effects among participants with criminal records. Experiment 5 shows that these patterns persist when addressing potential confounds and when moral preferences are weaker. Our findings challenge procedural justice models, highlighting the importance of addressing moral disagreement in policy contexts.

Lack of belonging can negatively affect mental and physical health, but experiences with social rejection are routine. Two studies examined whether being to mitigate the risk of rejection in real-world relationships motivates people to defensively immerse themselves in symbolic social bonds with celebrities and fictional characters. Study 1 (four daily diary samples) and Study 2 (cross-sectional sample) operationalized the ability to mitigate risk (i.e., the ability to self-protect) through the amount of time spent in the physical company of potentially hurtful/rejecting close others. In both studies, unmitigated risk (i.e., spending more time with potentially hurtful/rejecting close others) predicted increased/greater engagement with symbolic social bonds. These studies are the first to reveal specific characteristics of social rejection experiences that motivate escape into symbolic social bonds.

Across eight preregistered studies ( = 6,464), we apply an approach informed by social norm theory to investigate perceptions and realities of support for Initiatives for Future Generations (IFGs)-institutions and policies designed to ensure political representation for and protection of future generations. We find widespread bipartisan support for IFGs alongside pluralistic ignorance: Americans vastly underestimate their peers' support. Correcting misperceptions enhances individual support, underscoring the role of social norms in shaping collective action. We also find modest-albeit mixed-evidence that interventions aimed at increasing intergenerational concern can boost support for IFGs without exacerbating pluralistic ignorance. These interventions may serve as a complement to norm-corrective approaches by engaging moral motivations alongside informational strategies. Beyond highlighting the value of correcting norm misperceptions in safeguarding future generations' welfare, we explore motivational explanations for pluralistic ignorance and emphasize that policymakers hold the power to implement IFGs with confidence and the public is behind them.

How does one attain meaning? Though pivotal to well-being, this question has been explored mainly within symbolic and philosophical domains, with little focus on its cognitive processes. We present a theoretical integration of meaning and attention, followed by five studies investigating their relationship in lab experiments and everyday life (total = 1,654). Experimental findings indicate that meaning increased attention (Studies 1 and 3), and attention increased meaning, but only when meaning could be found in a stimulus (Studies 2a, 2b, and 3). An experience-sampling study further reveals a positive meaning-attention association at dispositional, situational, and cross-levels (Study 4). Across varied daily activities, participants reported greater meaning when they paid more attention. These studies also explored the interplay of meaning and attention with boredom, negative emotions, and subjective well-being. Together, our results suggest that paying attention during everyday activities can, in some instances, enhance the experience of meaning.

Maximizers, as opposed to satisficers, are defined as decision-makers who consider many alternatives to make the best choice. We adopted records in Taobao (the largest e-commerce platform in China) in 2022 to quantify individual maximization strategy inclination (the number of within-subcategory items that a consumer account considers prior to a first-time purchase). Using this index, we examined whether real-world behaviors in Taobao could be explained by three aspects of theories suggested by previous studies on maximizers, namely, pre-purchase decision paralysis, post-purchase regret (maximization paradox), and the Sisyphus effect. The results revealed that maximizers (vs. non-maximizers) are more likely to end decision-making processes with abandonment, rely on their evaluations instead of those of others, ruminate alternatives even after decisions, retract decisions, and express dissatisfaction about decisions. When evaluating options for the second time, maximizers even construct a larger candidate option set. Most between-person effects remained significant after controlling within-person variations.

Children morally prioritize humans over animals less than adults do. Is this because children are less speciesist-meaning they place less moral weight on mere species membership? Or is it because they give less weight to differences in cognitive capacity between humans and other animals? We investigated this in two experiments, presenting children and adult participants in the United States and Spain with moral trade-off dilemmas. These dilemmas involved individuals who varied in species membership (human vs. monkey) and cognitive capacity. Across both cultures, children were less likely than adults to prioritize humans over animals, regardless of cognitive capacity. In addition, participants tended to prioritize individuals with higher cognitive capacities, regardless of species membership-though this effect was less robust in children. Our findings suggest that children in these Western contexts are indeed less speciesist than adults, though they do not rule out developmental changes in the moral weight assigned to cognitive capacity.

Most people are interested in improving themselves, but they show less interest in improving on moral traits. Why don't people particularly want to be more moral, and why do people prioritize improving certain traits more than others? Across four preregistered studies of U.K.-based CloudResearch ( = 252; = 110) and Behavioral Research Lab ( = 303, = 301) participants, we test four classes of explanations. Results rule out explanations based on the ideas that moral traits are seen as more difficult to change and as either more or less causally central. Instead, people are less interested in moral improvements because they believe (a) that they are already highly moral and (b) that nonmoral improvements would more effectively improve their happiness and goal attainment. These results clarify the perceived tradeoffs between well-being and morality and show that personal well-being is a central motivation for personality change.

People's beliefs about sexual minorities are intertwined with their beliefs about gender (i.e., the sexuality-as-gendered framework), leading to the prediction that the amount of friendly contact with sexual minorities will be related to one's beliefs about gender. We test this prediction across two studies (total = 860), to show that reported friendships with sexual minorities relate not only to beliefs about sexual minorities, but also to attitudes toward people who are gender atypical, beliefs about traditional gender roles and norms, and endorsement of different versions of sexism. Our findings indicate that the sexuality-as-gendered framework involves not only people's cognitions in terms of beliefs and attitudes, but also the types of interpersonal relationships they maintain.

Social anxiety (SA) entails perceiving interactions as threatening and is linked to detrimental social outcomes. This study tested whether individuals scoring higher on SA navigate interactions better when believing the impressions people form of others are relatively fixed (fixed mindset), thereby making interactions feel more controlled and less demanding. A Preliminary Study established that holding a fixed mindset attenuates how demanding interactions feel among individuals higher on SA. Three experiments manipulated impression formation mindsets. In Study 1, higher SA was associated with making a negative impression in a self-presentation task following a growth mindset induction (belief that impressions are malleable) but not following a fixed mindset induction. This pattern was repeated in Study 2 involving a stress-inducing self-presentation task. In Study 3, following a fixed mindset induction, SA predicted better real-life social experiences. In conclusion, a fixed model of impression formation may improve social functioning among individuals predisposed to SA.

Despite the potential to significantly increase the impact of donations, people often fail to prioritize the cost-effectiveness of charities. This paper examines an explanation for why people may donate less effectively due to reputational concerns that favor empathizing with donation recipients rather than deliberating about the cost-effectiveness of charities. Across seven studies, we find that "deliberators" are perceived as less moral and less desirable as social partners than "empathizers." Moreover, people accurately anticipate the reputational costs of deliberation and are more likely to donate to causes that evoke more empathy but are less cost-effective when reputational concerns are highlighted. Our findings suggest that there are disincentives for selecting charities by deliberating about their cost-effectiveness, as people are more rewarded for signaling socially valued moral traits than for prioritizing charitable impact.

Many people use online dating profiles to meet partners and screen potential dates. Unlike other online contexts, targets might be more motivated to misrepresent their personality, making accuracy difficult. How strongly are people motivated to misrepresent themselves, how transparent is personality, and which individual differences might explain these processes? Online daters (targets, = 180) submitted their profiles, described their personality and the impression they wanted to convey. Judges ( = 196) viewed these profiles and rated targets' personalities. Overall, targets wanted to be seen accurately and positively, and they successfully presented desired personas without their personality leaking through, suggesting being seen accurately is within targets' control. Some processes were related to outcomes (e.g., swiping decisions) and explained by individual differences (e.g., attachment). These findings highlight the importance of considering self-presentational goals in online dating and when indexing accuracy in general.

Charitable giving is essential for supporting collective action on various social and environmental problems. Social norms are known to sometimes affect giving, but not always. In this multilevel meta-analysis, we aggregate data from 113 independent samples from research involving 100,469 people in 22 countries to understand the extent to which social norms influence charitable giving ( = .18, < .001). We test a range of theoretical, methodological, and sample moderators to understand the conditions under which norms may be most effective at promoting giving. The relationship was stronger for injunctive than descriptive norms, when the norm referent was friends and family (vs. no referent or another ingroup), for internalized (vs. externally presented) norms, and potentially when the giving behavior was observed by others. Norms appear effective for most people, and especially for younger people and in non-WEIRD and collectivist contexts. Effects, however, were only found in published research and non-preregistered studies.

The present studies investigate how populist attitudes influence perceptions of personal control. Populist reasoning is proposed to enhance personal control by promoting a sense of belonging to an agentic group ("the people") that opposes a perceived antagonistic "corrupt elite." Across three experiments ( = 733), participants were asked to adopt either a populist or a pluralistic reasoning style. In Study 3, the salience of high versus low personal control was additionally manipulated. Results showed that populist reasoning increased participants' sense of control, particularly in relation to specific goals, such as performing well in an upcoming debate. However, making low control salient tended to diminish this effect. These findings suggest that populist narratives may be appealing during crises due to their control-enhancing function. The novel experimental method for manipulating populist attitudes opens new pathways for testing causal effects and understanding the motivational drivers of populism, potentially contributing to future interventions in this field.

Although both Democrats and Republicans tend to be more tolerant of democratic norm violations that benefit their own party, this pattern is not always symmetrical, even when political stakes appear identical. Two experiments ( = 2,352) tested competing explanations: that partisans differ in democratic commitment, their tendency to rationalize violations as legitimate, or the values they prioritize (e.g., voter access vs. election integrity). Both parties rationalized weaker opposition to beneficial violations as more democratic. However, Republicans in Study 1 were more responsive to partisan advantage without showing similarly greater democratic rationalization and more tolerant of mail-in voting restrictions regardless of partisan benefit. These differences disappeared in Study 2 when different violations were tested, suggesting such asymmetries are issue-specific rather than fixed. Overall, the findings suggest that partisan gaps in support for democratic norm violations reflect the politicization of particular practices more than stable differences in commitment to democracy.