How did funding structures-the source, instrument, currency, and counterparty location of financing-relate to the financial stress experienced in different countries and sectors during Covid-19? Banks and corporates with a higher share of funding from non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) or in US dollars experienced significantly greater stress, while more funding in debt instruments (versus loans) or cross-border (versus domestically) did not affect resilience. Policies targeting these structural vulnerabilities (US$ swap lines and NBFI policies) were more effective at mitigating stress than policies supporting banks, even controlling for macroeconomic policies. Macroprudential regulations should prioritize exposures to NBFI and dollar funding.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented shift of consumption from services to goods. We study this demand reallocation in a multi-sector model featuring sticky prices, input-output linkages, and labor reallocation costs. Reallocation costs hamper the increase in the supply of goods, causing inflationary pressures. These pressures are amplified by the fact that goods prices are more flexible than services prices. We estimate the model allowing for demand reallocation, sectoral productivity, and aggregate labor supply shocks. The demand reallocation shock explains a large portion of the rise in U.S. inflation in the aftermath of the pandemic.

A tailor-made survey documents consumers' perceptions of the US economy's response to a large shock: the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey ran at a daily frequency between March 2020 and July 2021. Consumer's perceptions regarding output and inflation react rapidly. Uncertainty is pervasive. A business-cycle model calibrated to the consumers' views provides an interpretation. The rise in household uncertainty accounts for two-thirds of the fall in output. Different perceptions about monetary policy can explain why consumers and professional forecasters agree on the recessionary impact, but have sharply divergent views about inflation.

This paper introduces the Consumer Expectations Survey (CES), a new online, high frequency panel survey of euro area consumers' expectations and behaviour. The paper also investigates whether public perceptions about fiscal support measures introduced during the pandemic have influenced spending behaviour. We show that simple and factual information treatments about government support policies that are communicated to random subsets of respondents can help improve consumers' perceptions about the adequacy of fiscal interventions relative to that of an untreated control group. We find evidence that this improvement in beliefs has a causal effect on consumer spending, in particular raising spending on large items like holidays and cars. Moreover, we show that such beliefs influence household expectations about own income prospects, future access to credit and financial sentiment, while they do not affect expectations about future taxes, implying no evidence of Ricardian effects in household behaviour. We find that perceptions affect spending also amongst households that did not receive any government support, suggesting that fiscal interventions can have broader consequences as they influence the behaviour of groups beyond the targeted ones.

In search-and-matching models, the nonlinear nature of search frictions increases average unemployment rates during periods with higher volatility. These frictions are not, however, by themselves sufficient to raise unemployment following an increase in uncertainty; though they may do so in conjunction with the common assumption of wages being determined by Nash bargaining. Importantly, option-value considerations play no role in the standard model with free entry. In contrast, when the mass of entrepreneurs is finite and there is heterogeneity in firm-specific productivity, a rise in perceived uncertainty robustly increases the option value of waiting and reduces job creation.

We propose a novel two-agent New Keynesian model to study the interaction of fiscal policy and household heterogeneity in a tractable environment. Workers can save in bonds subject to portfolio adjustment costs; firm ownership is concentrated among capitalists who do not supply labor. The model is consistent with micro data on empirical intertemporal marginal propensities to consume, and it avoids implausible profit income effects on labor supply. Relative to the traditional two-agent model, these features imply, respectively, a lower sensitivity of consumption to the composition of public financing; and smaller fiscal multipliers alongside pronounced redistributive effects.

We propose a model with involuntary unemployment, incomplete markets, and nominal rigidity, in which the effects of government spending are state-dependent. An increase in government purchases raises aggregate demand, tightens the labor market and reduces unemployment. This in turn lowers unemployment risk and thus precautionary saving, leading to a larger response of private consumption than in a model with perfect insurance. The output multiplier is further amplified through a composition effect, as the fraction of high-consumption households in total population increases in response to the spending shock. These features, along with the matching frictions in the labor market, generate significantly larger multipliers in recessions than in expansions. As the pool of job seekers is larger during downturns than during expansions, the concavity of the job-finding probability with respect to market tightness implies that an increase in government spending reduces unemployment risk more in the former case than in the latter, giving rise to countercyclical multipliers.

A general equilibrium model featuring multiple realistic sources of financial frictions is developed to study how different constraints interact in equilibrium. We highlight, distinguish, and evaluate their differential impacts and rich interactions. The economic impact of financial inclusion policies in an economy depends not only on which constraint is alleviated, but also on the tightness of other constraints. Policy instruments should target the most binding constraint, which likely varies across countries. Moreover, there are important tradeoffs between financial inclusion, GDP, and the distribution of income. The transitional dynamics also differ from those in steady states. Policy makers should consider both.

In a life-cycle model, a retiree faces stochastic health depreciation and chooses consumption, health expenditure, and the allocation of wealth between bonds, stocks, and housing. The model explains key facts about asset allocation and health expenditure across health status and age. The portfolio share in stocks is low overall and is positively related to health, especially for younger retirees. The portfolio share in housing is negatively related to health for younger retirees and falls significantly in age. Finally, out-of-pocket health expenditure as a share of income is negatively related to health and rises in age.

Although government banks are frequently associated with political capture and resource misallocation, they may be well-positioned during times of crisis to provide countercyclical support. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Brazil's government banks substantially increased lending. Localities in Brazil with a high share of government banks received more loans and experienced better employment outcomes relative to localities with a low share of government banks. While increased government bank lending mitigated an economic downturn, we find that this lending was politically targeted, inefficiently allocated, and reduced productivity growth.

Countries that are more engaged in production sharing exhibit higher bilateral manufacturing output correlations. We use data on trade flows between US multinationals and their affiliates as well as trade between the United States and Mexican maquiladoras to measure production-sharing trade and its link with the business cycle. We then develop a quantitative model of international business cycles that generates a positive link between the extent of vertically integrated production-sharing trade and internationally synchronized business cycles. A key assumption in the model is a relatively low elasticity of substitution between home and foreign inputs in the production of the vertically integrated good.

In theory, improvements in healthy life expectancy should generate increases in the average age of retirement, with little effect on savings rates. In many countries, however, retirement incentives in social security programs prevent retirement ages from keeping pace with changes in life expectancy, leading to an increased need for life-cycle savings. Analyzing a cross-country panel of macroeconomic data, we find that increased longevity raises aggregate savings rates in countries with universal pension coverage and retirement incentives, though the effect disappears in countries with pay-as-you-go systems and high replacement rates.