Do people have mental representations of what apologetic faces look like? Do representations differ by gender? We used reverse correlation to (a) generate images that approximate mental representations of apologetic faces, (b) determine whether these images are rated highly on apology-related characteristics, and (c) see if ratings differ by gender of the image generator, target face, and/or image rater. Faces generated from male and female base faces to look apologetic were rated as more apologetic, remorseful, and sad than the base face, demonstrating these mental representations can be approximated using reverse correlation. Findings suggest visually represented apologies express multiple apology-related characteristics. Study 2 revealed the visual templates of faces generated by the gender ingroup appeared more apologetic than those of the gender outgroup; women-generated female faces were most apologetic, and men-generated female faces were least apologetic. Findings highlight gender differences in mental representation, but not perception, of female apologetic faces.

A popular intervention for increasing support for peace in violent intergroup conflicts is to describe the peaceful resolution of other conflicts. In four experiments, we tested the effectiveness of this approach in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by exposing Jewish-Israelis to information about the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process, or about tourism in Northern Ireland as a control. We found that learning about the historical peace process generally led participants to view conflicts as more malleable, their own conflict as less unique, and led to unfreezing of conflict-related beliefs. However, it neither increased hope nor consistently boosted support for conciliatory policies. We explored boundary conditions and found effects were often stronger among leftist and centrist compared with rightists. Moreover, explicitly drawing analogies between conflicts at the outset proved ineffective, whereas exposing participants to the historical conflict and peace process without mentioning the proximal conflict was more successful.

The state's monopoly on sovereignty can be challenged by criminal systems capable of gaining legitimacy within communities. Understanding the psychological basis of such legitimacy requires broadening traditional conceptualizations of authority to consider how it operates without legal backing and outside formal channels. This research introduces the Legitimacy of Secret Power (L-SP) Scale, a tool measuring individuals' appraisal of illegal groups' power. We validated L-SP through three studies ( = 3,173). Findings demonstrate a reliable, 20-item mono-factorial structure. Study 3 tested L-SP's measurement invariance in the UK, Italy, Japan, and the US. Across studies, L-SP correlated with support for illegality, ideologies of masculine honor, and social dominance. It was inversely related to the perceived national threat of criminal groups, democratic attitudes, and police legitimacy. Notably, L-SP predicted individuals' willingness to report criminal groups independently of their fear of these groups or perceptions of police legitimacy. Theoretical implications and future directions are discussed.

The Stop Asian Hate movement is a collective for several anti-Asian-violence rallies and organizations in the United States (US). Research indicates that when asked to think about who is Asian, Americans' prototype primarily comprises East Asian individuals (e.g., people from China, Japan, Korea) at the exclusion of people from other regions of Asia (e.g., South Asia). The current work extends this prototypicality research to examine implications for social justice movements. We focused on the Stop Asian Hate movement, which was designed to raise awareness and protest racial discrimination directed towards Asian Americans, particularly in light of COVID-19. Three studies tested whether people's prototypes regarding who is Asian influenced who they believe is represented by the Stop Asian Hate movement, as well as potential implications of this bias. Compared to South Asians, people judged East Asians as more represented by the Stop Asian Hate movement (Study 1). When described as being the victim of a hate crime, participants perceived East Asian targets to be more credible, more traumatized, and their reporting of the crime on the SAAPI website was deemed more appropriate, compared to South Asian targets (Studies 2-3), effects that were mediated by judgments of prototypicality (Study 3).

Although the number of mixed-race couples is increasing in North America, these couples continue to experience stigma and discrimination, which can have deleterious effects on individuals in these relationships. In three samples, we examined perceivers' first impressions of targets in mixed-race couples when viewed with their romantic partner versus alone, including their warmth and competence (Sample 1a), global morality (Sample 1b), and specific stereotypic behaviors including likelihood to betray, conform, and be prejudiced (Sample 1c). Partner effects occurred for specific stereotypes relevant for intergroup behaviors such that individuals in mixed-race couples were rated as more likely to betray close others and to be less conforming and less prejudiced than individuals in same-race couples when viewed with their partners. These results suggest that specific stereotypes relevant for intergroup relations are affected by the race of targets' romantic partners and lay the foundation for understanding the unique challenges faced by members of mixed-race couples.

Personal secrets are a ubiquitous fact of group life, but the conditions under which they are revealed have not been explored. In five studies, we assessed secret disclosure in groups governed by four models of human sociality (Communal Sharing, Equality Matching, Authority Ranking, Market Pricing; Fiske). In Studies 1a and 1b, participants indicated their willingness to disclose secrets in hypothetical groups governed by the models. In Studies 2a and 2b, participants rated how much a group in which they disclosed secrets or nonsecrets is governed by the models. In Study 3, participants indicated their disclosure of various types of secrets in Communal Sharing and Equality Matching groups to which they belonged. Across studies, disclosure was most strongly associated with Communal Sharing, followed by Equality Matching. Study 3 further showed that identity fusion predicted disclosure in these two kinds of groups. Implications for understanding disclosure of personal secrets in group contexts were discussed.

Because Black and Arab men may be stereotyped as hostile in different ways (i.e., physical vs. ideological), this study assessed whether an old age identity versus gay identity would reduce stereotypes related to hostility for Black and Arab men differently. We assessed whether the addition of an old age identity reduces hostile stereotype content more for Black men than for Arab men. In line with our hypothesis, an old age identity resulted in participants reporting fewer hostile stereotypes for Black men, but not for Arab men. We also assessed whether a gay identity reduces hostile stereotype content in the same way for Black and Arab men. As expected, a gay identity resulted in participants reporting fewer hostile stereotypes for both male groups. The present study demonstrates the importance of considering intersecting identities in person perception and highlights the unique challenges faced by men belonging to these intersecting groups.

Research on the interplay between inclusive norms and intergroup contact on improving intergroup orientations has yielded conflicting results, suggesting either that an experience of personal contact is necessary to have a positive effect of inclusive norms or that such personal experience is not always necessary. To clarify this issue, across four studies ( = 835), we investigated the influence of inclusive norms on positive intergroup orientations as a function of personal experiences of intergroup contact. Study 1 demonstrated that inclusive norms are more strongly correlated with experiences of personal contact with outgroups with whom opportunities of contact are more (i.e., immigrants) than less (i.e., refugees) frequent. Study 2 provided experimental evidence for this finding showing that inclusive norms increase prejudiced nationals' willingness to engage in future contact with immigrants but not with refugees, suggesting that conformity to inclusive norms depends on varying contact opportunities with the outgroups. Studies 3 and 4 confirmed that prejudiced nationals conformed to inclusive norms specifically when experienced positive contact with a refugee (experimentally induced with the imagined contact paradigm), compared with no contact (Study 3) or negative contact (Study 4). We discuss the implications of these findings for research on intergroup contact, social influence, and intergroup relations.

Unlike one-time lab manipulations of exclusion, in real life, many people experience exclusion, from others and from groups, over extended periods, raising the question of whether individuals could, over time, develop hypo- or hypersensitive responses to chronic exclusion. In Study 1, we subjected participants to repeated experiences of inclusion or exclusion (three Cyberball games, time lag of three days, = 194; 659 observations). We find that repeatedly excluded individuals become hypersensitive to inclusion, but not to exclusion. Study 2 ( = 183) tested whether individuals with chronic experiences of real-world exclusion show hypo- or hypersensitive responses to a novel episode of exclusion. In line with Study 1, exclusion hurt to the same extent regardless of baseline levels of chronic exclusion in daily life. However, chronically excluded individuals show more psychological distress in general. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for dealing with chronically excluded individuals and groups.

Despite the increasing diversity of religious affiliations in the United States, little research has explored the nature and structure of religious stereotypes of Muslims in America. The present research explores the gendered dimensions of stereotypes of both Muslims and Christians, using a multimethod approach. In Study 1, participants engaged in visual representations of intersectional and superordinate identities using Venn diagrams and slider tasks. Study 2 elicited open trait listings for religious, gender, and intersectional groups, with the most common traits reported for each group. In a conceptual replication, Study 3 asked participants to rate each group for the applicability of the most common traits identified in Study 2. Across the three studies, we found clear and consistent support for intersectionality effects. Unique stereotypic traits were identified for each intersectional group that were not present in either religious or gender superordinate identity. Stereotypes of Christians as a superordinate group contained a balanced representation of Christian men and Christian women traits. In contrast, Muslim stereotypes were strongly influenced by androcentric assumptions, with approximately 80% of the traits ascribed to Muslims overlapping with those of Muslim men. In addition, Muslim women were rated as significantly different from both Muslims and Muslim men on all trait evaluations. This was not observed with Christians, who showed little differentiation by gender. This research provides a rare systematic analysis of the gendered nature of religious stereotypes of Christians and Muslims and contributes to the developing literature on intersectionality and prototypicality.

The present research investigates how emotional displays shape reactions to ingroup and outgroup members when people are reminded of death. We hypothesized that under mortality salience, emotions that signal social distance promote worldview defense (i.e., increased ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation), whereas emotions that signal affiliation promote affiliation need (i.e., reduced ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation). In three studies, participants viewed emotional displays of ingroup and/or outgroup members after a mortality salience or control manipulation. Results revealed that under mortality salience, anger increased ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Study 1), enhanced perceived overlap with the ingroup (Study 3), and increased positive facial behavior to ingroup displays-measured via the Facial Action Coding System (Studies 1 and 2) and electromyography of the zygomaticus major muscle (Study 3). In contrast, happiness decreased ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Study 2), and increased positive facial behavior towards outgroup members (Study 3). The findings suggest that, in times of threat, emotional displays can determine whether people move away from unfamiliar others or try to form as many friendly relations as possible.

Dynamic models of impression formation posit that bottom-up factors (e.g., a target's facial features) and top-down factors (e.g., perceiver knowledge of stereotypes) continuously interact over time until a stable categorization or impression emerges. Most previous work on the dynamic resolution of judgments over time has focused on either categorization (e.g., "is this person male/female?") or specific trait impressions (e.g., "is this person trustworthy?"). In two mousetracking studies-exploratory ( = 226) and confirmatory ( = 300)-we test a domain-general effect of cultural stereotypes shaping the process underlying impressions of targets. We find that the trajectories of participants' mouse movements gravitate toward impressions congruent with their stereotype knowledge. For example, to the extent that a participant reports knowledge of a "Black men are less [trait]" stereotype, their mouse trajectory initially gravitates toward categorizing individual Black male faces as "less [trait]," regardless of their final judgment of the target.

This study integrates cultivation and intergroup threat theories to examine media cultivation effects during the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that U.S. media have consistently portrayed China as a threat and target of blame. The cultivation of media has thus resulted in perceived threat of and blame on Chinese people for the COVID-19 pandemic. Results of a cross-sectional survey in two samples (MTurk: = 375; college: = 566) showed that the amount of media consumption predicted stronger perceptions that Chinese people were a health threat, and also predicted blame on Chinese people for the COVID-19 outbreak. Threat perception and blame were further associated with support of media content that derogated China, stronger intentions to attack, and weaker intentions to help Chinese people. The findings have profound implications for intergroup threat and cultivation research, and practical importance for intergroup relations, especially when the global community finds itself in a public crisis.

The global outbreak of novel coronavirus disease COVID-19 has caused intergroup discrimination associated with the disease to become increasingly prominent. Research demonstrates that the attitudes and behaviors of third-party observers significantly impact the progression of discrimination incidents. This study tested a parallel mediating model in which the attribution tendencies of observers influence their behavioral intentions through the mediating effect of the emotions of anger and contempt. The first two studies confirmed the proposed model with discrimination incidents reported against "returnees from Wuhan" and "returning workers from Hubei." Study 3 further manipulated the attribution tendencies of observers, providing empirical evidence for the causality from attribution tendencies to emotions, confirming the validity of the model. These findings enrich the cognitive (attribution)-emotion-action model, further enhancing our understanding of the role of third parties in intergroup conflicts, with implications for the management of people's emotions and behaviors in social crises.

COVID-19 has plagued the globe since January 2020, infecting millions and claiming the lives of several hundreds of thousands (at the time of writing). Despite this, many individuals have ignored public health guidance and continued to socialize in groups. Emergent work has highlighted the potential role that ideology plays in such behavior, and judgements of it. In response to this contemporary cultural phenomenon, we tested whether judgements of those allegedly flouting the guidance on social distancing were influenced by an interaction between the ideologies of those providing judgements and those allegedly breaking the rules. Our data suggest that judgements of those flouting social distancing guidance are influenced by ideology in a symmetrical way. That is, both liberals and conservatives condemn outgroup flouting more than ingroup flouting. We discuss this finding in the context of theoretical work into ideological symmetries, and the implications of growing ideological polarization in contemporary Western democracies.

How do global citizens respond to a global health emergency? The present research examined the association between global citizen identification and prosociality using two cross-national datasets-the World Values Survey (Study 1, = 93,338 from 60 countries and regions) and data collected in 11 countries at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (Study 2, = 5,427). Results showed that individuals who identified more strongly as global citizens reported greater prosociality both generally (Study 1) and more specifically in the COVID-19 global health emergency (Study 2). Notably, global citizen identification was a stronger predictor of prosociality in response to COVID-19 than national identification (Study 2). Moreover, analyses revealed that shared ingroup identity accounted for the positive association between global citizen identification and prosociality (Study 2). Overall, these findings highlight global citizenship as a unique and promising direction in promoting prosociality and solidarity, especially in the fight against COVID-19.

Anecdotal reports suggested an uptick in anti-Asian prejudice corresponding with the initial outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Examining responses from White U.S. citizens ( = 589) during the first months of the pandemic, this study tested: (a) whether actual intensity (official number of cases or deaths reported) or perceived intensity (participants' estimates of the same) of the COVID-19 outbreak predicted indicators of racial outgroup prejudice, particularly those associated with cross-group interaction, (b) whether outgroup prejudice was oriented toward Asian people specifically, or toward racial outgroups more broadly (e.g., toward both Asian people and Black people), and (c) whether contact with racial outgroups moderated relations between COVID-19 intensity and racial prejudice. Results showed that perceived COVID-19 intensity was associated with prejudice indicators representing the desire for social distance from Asian people, as well as from Black people, yet it was unrelated to reports of negative affect toward either racial outgroup. These patterns support the idea that prejudice during periods of disease outbreak might functionally serve to reduce willingness for interaction with, and likelihood of infection from, racial outgroups. Contact moderated the relation between official reports of COVID-19 intensity and support for anti-China travel policies, such that greater contact with Asian people was associated with less support for exclusionary, anti-China travel policies when actual COVID-19 intensity was high. Overall, these results suggest that intensity of disease threat can exacerbate racial outgroup prejudice and reduce willingness for cross-group interaction, but that intergroup contact may sometimes provide a prejudice-attenuating effect.

This article presents the results of three studies that examine how the perceived opinions of others are related to sexual minorities' support for social change toward greater equality. Results of two cross-sectional studies (Study 1: = 1,220; Study 2: = 904) reveal that perceived intolerance (i.e., perceived intolerant societal norms) is indirectly related to intentions to engage in collective action in both negative and positive ways: the negative effect was mediated by lower perceptions of perceived efficacy; positive effects were mediated by greater anger (about the legal situation and public opinion) and greater perceived need for a movement. Study 3 ( = 408) replicates this conflicting effect with a delayed outcome measure by showing that perceived intolerant norms were indirectly, both negatively and positively, associated with actual collective action engagement. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our expanded social identity model of collective action.

The present research examines the conditions under which educating non-stigmatized individuals about the experiences of members of stigmatized groups leads to paternalistic or more respectful views of the target. We propose that when these efforts ask members of non-stigmatized groups to focus only on the difficulties experienced by stigmatized targets, they will lead to more paternalistic views of targets because they portray targets as being in need of help. In contrast, we propose that when these efforts take a broader focus on stigmatized targets and include their resilience in the face of their difficulties, they will lead to more respectful views of targets. Four studies supported these predictions. Across studies, White participants who focused only on a Black target's difficulties subsequently perceived the target as more helpless and less competent than controls. Participants who focused on the target's resilience in the face of difficulties perceived him as more competent.

The racial demographic shift occurring in many Western countries provides a unique context to study the reactions of a high-power group (White people) to the potential loss of their privileged position in society. Three experiments ( = 77, = 302, = 555) conducted in Canada, the US, and the UK showed that White people who are reminded about the ongoing demographic changes and who see race relations as a zero-sum game whereby any gains by minorities must come at the expense of the majority, experience stronger collective angst and, to a lesser extent, fear (but not anger). In turn, collective angst, but not the other negative group-based emotions, fuels their motivation to protect the existing intergroup hierarchy by withdrawing support for progressive social movements and increases anti-immigration sentiments. Downregulating the existential threat experienced by White majorities in the face of a racial demographic shift may be one way to reduce acrimonious behavioral intentions aimed at preserving their place in the social hierarchy.